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LI-WEN LIN* 
Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility? 
Legislative Innovation and Judicial Application in China 
(Draft Version March 2018) 
(Final Version Forthcoming in American Journal of Comparative Law) 
Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is often understood as voluntary corporate behavior 
beyond legal compliance. The recent emergence of CSR legislation is challenging this typical 
understanding. A number of countries including China, Indonesia and India have expressly stated 
in corporate law that companies shall undertake CSR. The CSR law is controversial. Critics of 
CSR see the law as an unwise effort to challenge profit maximization as the only social 
responsibility of the corporation. Even CSR advocates welcome the CSR law with great caution. 
Given the vague statutory language of CSR, the practical application of the law places high 
demands on the judiciary. However, as the countries that have adopted the CSR law are mainly 
developing countries with rather weak legal institutions, it raises a common concern that the law 
is simply an innovation without implementation. This article conducts an empirical study on 
China, an early adopter of the CSR legislation. The empirical analysis of Chinese court cases 
reveals what the CSR law means in judicial practice, whether CSR is in fact mandatory and in 
what types of disputes CSR is relevant or outcome determinative. Among various findings, this 
article shows that the CSR law is by no means as useless as commonly expected. The meaningful 
application of the law is attributable to the law’s fit with China’s legal infrastructure and socio-
* Lin is an assistant professor at the University of British Columbia Peter A. Allard School of Law, Vancouver, Canada.
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political institutions. Chinese courts have innovatively applied CSR in various contexts far 
beyond the traditionally Western-led focus on directors’ fiduciary duties. The Chinese 
experience suggests that the significance of the CSR law is more of a judicial review standard 
than a corporate behavior standard, which further confirms the importance of judicial capacity in 
implementing the vague law. This article concludes with insights for the corporate purpose 
debate in comparative perspective and policy suggestions for adopting the CSR legislation.     
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) often refers to “companies voluntarily going 
beyond what the law requires to achieve social and environmental objectives during the course of 
their daily business activities.”1 CSR is typically considered voluntary and beyond compliance 
with the law. However, law is playing an increasing role in shaping the development of CSR. 
The voluntary assumption is becoming shaky. Governments are fostering CSR through various 
legal means.2 The most common regulatory approach is disclosure. Companies are required to 
disclose social and environmental information to the public. Disclosure is indirect regulation. It 
does not mandate any substantive change of corporate behavior. Rather it relies on interested 
information users such as investors, consumers and communities to pressure firms to engage in 
more CSR activities.3 According to a 2016 report jointly produced by KPMG International, 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Center 
for Corporate Governance in Africa, almost 400 sustainability reporting instruments have been 
introduced in 64 countries and more than two thirds of the instruments are mandatory through 
government regulation.4  
Direct regulation that mandates CSR behavior is very rare. Yet, a few countries such as 
China, India and Indonesia have taken a progressive approach to CSR under corporate law, a 
legal area where CSR has been deemed highly controversial. Their corporate statutes expressly 
                                                          
1 See European Commission, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the EU, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=331. 
2 See Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New 
Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). 
3 See Archon Fung et al., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 
(2007).  
4 See Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Carrots and Sticks: Global Trends in Sustainability Reporting 
Regulation and Policy (2016 edition), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Carrots%20and%20Sticks-
2016.pdf.  
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state that companies shall engage in CSR activities. China is probably the first country in the 
world that expressly writes the phrase of “corporate social responsibility” into its corporate 
statute. China’s 2006 Company Law provides that “[i]n the course of doing business, a company 
shall comply with laws and administrative regulations, conform to social morality and business 
ethics, act in good faith, subject itself to the government and the public supervision, and 
undertake social responsibility.”5 As a Chinese commentator noted, this provision is “a big 
contribution made by Chinese legislators to corporate law around the world.”6 Just one year after 
China’s legislative move, in 2007, Indonesia passed an amendment to its corporate statute to 
include that “the company having its business activities in the field of and/or related to natural 
resources shall be obliged to perform its social and environmental responsibility.”7 More 
recently, India’s 2013 Companies Act requires directors to “act in good faith in order to promote 
the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of 
the company, its employees, the shareholders, the community and for the protection of 
environment.”8 It further requires companies to establish a board-level CSR committee and 
contribute 2% of their average net profits in the previous three years to permissible CSR 
activities.9  
                                                          
5 See Chinese Company Law (2006), art.5. 
6 See Junhai Liu, XIN GONGSIFA DE ZHIDU CHUANGXIN: LIFA ZHENGDIAN YU JIESHI 
NANDIAN [INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION OF NEW COMPANY LAW: POINTS IN DISPUTE AND 
DIFFICULTIES IN INTERPRETATION OF LAWMAKING] 553 (2006). 
7 See Indonesian Law No. 40 of 2007 on Limited Liability Companies, art.74. See also, Assegaf Hamah & 
Partners, New Regulation on Mandatory CSR for Resources 
Companies Adds Little New, http://www.ahp.co.id/clientalert/ClientAlert25May2012.pdf. 
8 See Indian Companies Act (2013), s.166. For a detailed analysis of the mandatory CSR law in India, see 
Afra Afsharipour, Redefining Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465 
(2017). 
9 See Indian Companies Act (2013), s. 135. 
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The recent emergence of such CSR laws has raised controversies.10Advocates of 
shareholder primacy denounce this CSR legislation, believing that any deviation from 
shareholder interests would just do more harm than good. While CSR advocates generally 
welcome this legislative endeavor, their acceptance comes with reservations. A common concern 
is that although the CSR law appears imperative, it is probably merely aspirational in practice 
given that the statutory language of CSR is too vague to be operational.11  
  As the CSR law has become an emerging legal reality, there is an urgent need to look 
beyond the theoretical debate and examine the law’s real world application. CSR is a highly 
incomplete concept and possible CSR actions are hard to be standardized. Analogous to fiduciary 
duty in corporate law, CSR is “a residual concept that can include factual situations that no one 
has foreseen and categorized.”12 The meaning of CSR takes shape in concrete contexts rather 
than conceptual definitions. As a result, courts, as opposed to regulators, undertake a particularly 
important role in enforcing the CSR provision in the corporate statute.13 The legal transplant 
                                                          
10 The controversies are deeply rooted in the so-called corporate purpose debate or the CSR debate. For a 
summary of the normative CSR debate, see THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 19-226 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (providing a comprehensive review of arguments for 
and against CSR).   
11 See e.g., Patricia Rinwigati Wassgstein, The Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia: 
Problems and Implications, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 455, 461 (2011) (arguing that “Without the clear clarification that 
such a regulation would provide, Article 74 is more inspirational in character than it is any kind of operational 
regulation”); Knowledge@Wharton, Corporate Social Responsibility in India: No Clear Definition, but Plenty of 
Debate (August 2, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/corporate-social-responsibility-in-india-no-
clear-definition-but-plenty-of-debate/; Peixin Luo, Woguo Gongsi Shehui Zeren De Sifa Caipan Kunjing Ji Ruogan 
Jiejue Silu [The Judicial Adjudication Dilemma and Several Solutions for Corporate Social Responsibility in 
China], 12 LEGAL SCI.  66 (2007) (in Chinese) (arguing that Chinese courts are unlikely to apply the CSR law 
given its vagueness).  
12 See Robert Charles Clark, CORPORATE LAW 141 (1986). 
13 See Katherina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003); Katherina 
Pistor and Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdiction: Lessons from the Incomplete Law 
Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN 
A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003). According to the incomplete law 
theory provided by Professors Pistor and Xu, when law is highly incomplete, the optimal allocation of the residual 
lawmaking and enforcement powers depends on the extent of expected harm and the costs of standardizing actions 
that might cause harm.  They argue that fiduciary duty is a good example where the residual lawmaking and 
enforcement powers should be allocated to courts rather than regulators. The harm arising from a breach of fiduciary 
duties is typically limited to a subset of existing stakeholders related to the corporation, as opposed to systematic 
harm. Moreover, the costs of standardizing all possible actions that might result in breaching fiduciary duties are 
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literature of fiduciary duty provides abundant experiences across the world of how challenging it 
is to put the vague law into judicial practice despite a huge body of foreign case law available for 
reference.14 The CSR legislation, as a very recent legal innovation with extremely limited 
experience available for guidance, will certainly face far more challenges.  
In practice, how have courts applied the CSR provision under the corporate statute? 
Existing literature generally presents a depressing picture primarily with the analysis of the 
statutory language and the common perception of incompetent courts in developing countries 
that have adopted the law.15 This picture appears so pessimistic that empirical research on the 
judicial application of the CSR law is not something worth to pursue. Nevertheless, this article 
shows some hopeful lights shining from the generally negative image through an empirical 
analysis of Chinese court cases. The Chinese CSR law has been more than a decade old, which 
provides a long enough time span to evaluate its effects. The empirical research reveals what the 
CSR provision means in judicial practice, whether CSR is in fact mandatory, and in what types 
of disputes CSR is relevant or outcome determinative.  
Since 2006, at least 169 unique Chinese court cases have explicitly referenced the CSR 
provision or the CSR concept. Although the judicial application of the CSR law remains limited, 
the law is not useless or simply expressive. Chinese courts have used it in legally consequential 
manners. Moreover, the substantive interpretation of CSR is contingent on the political, 
                                                          
prohibitive. It requires a context-specific analysis to determine whether a duty of loyalty or a duty of care has been 
breached. Furthermore, as any daily corporate decisions may incur the issues of fiduciary duties, there would be 
excessive intervention in business management if enforced by regulators, who are proactive enforcers, compared to 
reactive courts. 
14 For European countries, see Katherina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, supra note 13. For Japan, see Hideki 
Kanda and Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese 
Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003). For China, see Guangdong Xu, Directors’ Duties in China, 14 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 57 (2013); Donald C. Clarke and Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to Minority 
Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People's Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN 
ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243-95 (D. Puchniak, H. Baum, and M. Ewing-
Chow eds., 2012). 
15 See supra note 11. 
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economic and social situations in China. For instance, Chinese courts take social stability as an 
important dimension of CSR. The judicial use of CSR has been made possible because the CSR 
law has certain fit with China’s macro and micro institutions including relevant legal 
infrastructure. 
The recent development of the CSR law provides a practical lens to revisit the purpose of 
the corporation in comparative perspective. The traditional debate about the corporate purpose 
tends to be firm-based, theoretical and insulated from real-world macro institutions including 
politics. The CSR law reveals the institutional forces in shaping corporate purpose in legal terms. 
In addition, this article provides insights into the multi-faceted relationship between CSR and 
corporate law. Existing corporate law scholarship, mainly based on the experience of Anglo-
Saxon countries, takes CSR analysis exclusively tied with directors’ fiduciary duties. However, 
Chinese courts have innovatively applied CSR in other corporate law contexts unrelated to 
directors’ fiduciary duties. The Chinese experience suggests that the CSR law is more of a 
judicial review standard than a corporate behavior standard. It further evidences that interpreting 
CSR places high demands on the judiciary.  
This article proceeds as follows. Section I explains the legal path of CSR in China. CSR 
began as a contractual transplant through global supply chains. It then has elevated to a 
legislative innovation and now it is begging judicial interpretation. Section II examines the 
possible extra-judicial effects of the CSR law in China. Section III gives an empirical analysis of 
the court cases expressly referring to the term of CSR. Section IV evaluates the empirical 
findings in comparative law perspective and offers policy advice for turning CSR into a 
mandatory duty.     
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I. THE LEGAL PATH OF CSR IN CHINA: FROM CONTRACTUAL 
TRANSPLANTATION TO LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION 
The term “qiye shehui zeren” (“corporate social responsibility”) is a neologism that 
arrived in China in the 1990s through global supply chains. The anti-sweatshop and 
environmental movements in the West caused multinational companies to adopt social and 
environmental criteria in selecting their suppliers. For instance, Apple Inc. has the Supplier Code 
of Conduct and Wal-Mart adopts the Standards for Vendor Partners. Such supplier standards are 
commonly referred to as “codes of vendor conduct.” Numerous suppliers in China are required 
to comply with such vendor codes. At first blush, the popularity of codes of vendor conduct in 
global supply chains may appear simply a result of imitation and dissemination of business 
practices among corporations. In fact, such vendor codes in global supply chains have regulatory 
features that culminate in a form of legal transplantation through private contracting.16 Codes of 
vendor conduct usually incorporate international law such as the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Labor Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They 
also often refer to multinational companies’ home-country labor and environmental laws. Rather 
than simply being included as part of multinational companies’ internal procurement handbooks, 
codes of vendor conduct are real legal obligations in supply contracts. Suppliers are required by 
contract to implement the incorporated social and environmental laws. To ensure suppliers’ 
compliance, multinational companies often use internal and external auditing systems to enforce 
the contractual obligations.  
                                                          
16 See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global 
Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (2009).  
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Incorporation of CSR standards in global supply contracts initially confronted great 
suspicion and hostility in China.17 It was often viewed as developed countries’ protectionist 
measures aimed at undermining the competitiveness of developing countries. The unregulated 
CSR certification industry in China further made Chinese suppliers perceive CSR no more than a 
label for purchase. Moreover, the lack of input from local suppliers gave rise to imperialism 
charges. However, with China’s transition “up the value chain” and the rising awareness of labor 
and environmental issues, the externally imposed notion of CSR became an increasingly 
accepted internal value. Homegrown CSR initiatives began to emerge in growing numbers after 
the turn of the century.18 Unlike Western countries where non-state actors such as non-
governmental organizations play an important role in advancing CSR, China takes a state-centric 
approach.19 The Chinese government has been active in using laws and regulations to promote 
CSR. Among these various state-led initiatives, the most salient and representative is probably 
the express recognition of CSR in China’s corporate law.  
CSR is a concept compatible with the stakeholder model of corporate governance. In this 
regard, the Chinese company law provides a fertile ground for CSR to thrive. Although China’s 
1994 Company Law, the first national corporate statute since 1949, did not expressly reference 
CSR, it resonated with some aspects of it, particularly regarding employee participation in 
management. For instance, limited liability companies and joint stock companies were required 
to include employee representatives on the board of supervisors; such employee representatives 
should be elected by employees. Companies were required to consult with trade unions and 
                                                          
17 See Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain: Resistance, 
Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 321 (2007). 
18 For a review of the CSR initiatives in China, see Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: 
Window Dressing or Structural Change?, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 64, 67-86 (2010). 
19 See Virginia Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State-Centric Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law in China, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 375 (2013). 
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employees when making decisions concerning employee wages, welfare, safe production 
processes, and other issues related to employee interests; companies were also required to invite 
employee representatives to attend relevant meetings.20 The 1994 Company Law also included 
an encompassing provision broad enough to embrace the idea of CSR. Article 14 provided that 
“Companies shall comply with the law, conform to business ethics, strengthen the construction 
of socialist civilization, and subject themselves to the government and public supervision in the 
course of doing business.”  
  China undertook a comprehensive revision to its corporate law in 2004. The reform 
efforts culminated in the 2006 Company Law. Article 5 of the statute makes it clear that “[i]n the 
course of doing business, a company shall comply with laws and administrative regulations, 
conform to social morality and business ethics, act in good faith, subject itself to the government 
and the public supervision, and undertake social responsibility.”21 CSR is now clearly engraved 
in China’s corporate statute.  
The low-transparency of China’s law-making process makes it hard to know why the 
legislators decided to expressly include CSR in the corporate statute. Nevertheless, some 
government officials and legal scholars who took part in the legislative process compiled and 
published the opinions considered in the law-making process, which may serve as an alternative 
source of the legislative history.22 In the deliberation process at the National People’s Congress 
of China (NPC), a group of thirty-one NPC delegates from Shanghai proposed that the company 
                                                          
20 See Chinese Company Law (1994), arts. 55 & 121.  
21 See Chinese Company Law (2006), art.5. 
22 See XIN GONGSIFA XIUDING YANJIU BAOGAO [A RESEARCH REPORT ON THE 
AMENDMENTS TO COMPANY LAW] (Kongtai Cao et al. eds., 2005) (in Chinese). The Chinese government did 
not disclose official documents concerning the legislative history. The editors of this report compiled the opinions 
considered in the legislative process. The leading editor was the head of the State Council’s Legislative Affairs 
Office, responsible for drafting laws and regulations. Other editors were also affiliated with the Office; some are 
prominent law professors in China. 
11 
 
law should make it clear that “companies shall protect and improve the interests of other 
stakeholders in addition to shareholders.”23 This group of NPC delegates also proposed that CSR 
might be included as one of the legislative purposes of the company law. A NPC delegate of the 
Jilin Province proposed that the company law should emphasize simultaneously shareholder 
wealth maximization and CSR. He proposed that, in addition to protecting shareholders’ 
interests, “companies should consider other social interests such as the interests of employees, 
consumers, creditors, local communities, environments, socially disadvantaged groups, and the 
general public.” 24 A number of NPC delegates of the Guangdong Province recommended that 
the company law should devote a specific section to the relationships between the company and 
its stakeholders.25 Interesting to note is that most of the NPC delegates who suggested the 
inclusion of CSR were mainly from regions that had relatively early exposure to the responsible 
supply chain movement.  
In addition to the inclusion of the general CSR provision, the 2006 Company Law 
improves employee rights in corporate governance, which adds some implementation details of 
the CSR principle. Under the new company law, the number of employee representatives on the 
supervisory board shall not be less than one third of the board.26 Moreover, it affirms the 
importance of labor protection that “the representative of the trade union may in accordance with 
the law enter into a collective contract on behalf of employees with the company in respect of 
wages, work hours, welfare, insurance, labor safety, etc.”27  
                                                          
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See Chinese Company Law (2006), art. 52; Chinese Company Law (2013), art 51. 
27 See Chinese Company Law (2006), art. 18. 
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The CSR provision does not only appear in the corporate statue but also in the 
partnership law. The 2007 Partnership Law includes a revised provision that “the partnership 
firm and its partners shall comply with laws and administrative regulations, conform to social 
morals and business ethics, and undertake social responsibility.”28 The 2000 Sole Proprietorship 
Law has a similar provision though it does not expressly reference CSR. It requires that “the sole 
proprietorship shall comply with laws and administrative regulations, conform to the principle of 
good faith, and shall not harm social and public interests.”29  Clearly, social responsibility is part 
of the laws governing the fundamental forms of business organizations in China.   
The nature of the CSR provision (i.e. Article 5) under China’s corporate statute, which 
appears mandatory on its face, has been a subject of debate among Chinese corporate law 
scholars. Some scholars take the CSR provision as an ethical obligation mainly because the 
corporate statute does not define what CSR is and does not provide any remedies for non-
compliance. As a result, they argue that the CSR provision is legally unenforceable and only 
exhortatory in nature.30 In contrast, some scholars argue that the CSR provision is mandatory. 31  
The corporate statute declares CSR as a fundamental legal principle of corporate governance. As 
a fundamental legal principle, it is mandatory in nature and shall be applied to interpretations of 
all provisions throughout the statute. Moreover, the company law has provided some specific 
obligations consistent with the CSR principle, such as employees’ participation in corporate 
governance. Other scholars argue that the CSR provision is both an ethical obligation and a legal 
obligation. Considered that the statutory language of Article 5 includes compliance with the law 
                                                          
28 See Chinese Partnership Law (2007), art. 7. 
29 See Chinese Sole Proprietorship Law (2000), art. 4. 
30 See e.g., Xiaoxing Chen, Qiye Shehui Zeren Falu Guizhi De Lixing Sikao Jian Ping Zhongguo Gongsifa 
Di 5 Tiao Zhi Guiding [Rational Consideration on the Legal Rule of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Comment 
on Article 5 of Chinese Company Law], in CHINA COMMERCIAL LAW ANNUAL 2009 (in Chinese) 50-53 
(Baoshu Wang et al. eds., 2009). 
31 See e.g., Liu, supra note 6, at 555. 
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and beyond, they argue that the meaning of CSR includes legal obligations and ethical 
expectations. CSR is legally enforceable in respect of compliance with the law. The ethical 
dimension of CSR creates a legal environment conducive to CSR shareholder proposals and 
stakeholder-oriented interpretations of directors’ fiduciary duties.32      
While Chinese scholars hold different views on the meaning of CSR under Article 5, they 
share a consensus that the CSR provision will probably be unused by courts. The unclear 
meaning of CSR makes it difficult for courts to apply in real cases. If there is any observable 
effect of the CSR provision, it will occur extrajudicially. Over the years, most Chinese scholars 
simply assumed, without empirical verification, the absence of judicial application of the CSR 
law.33 However, as this article will show, a non-negligible number of Chinese court cases in 
recent years have expressly referenced CSR and some cases have applied CSR to determine a 
legal outcome.      
 
II. NON-JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF CSR IN CHINA 
Before examining how Chinese courts apply the CSR provision under the corporate 
statute, it is important to investigate possible effects of the CSR provision outside the courtroom. 
Many Chinese legal scholars argue that the CSR provision under the corporate statute at best 
only serves exhortatory or educational purposes. As a result, the main effect of the CSR 
provision, if at all, takes place outside court cases. Although the CSR provision under the 2006 
Company Law provides an important legal foundation for CSR development in China, it is 
                                                          
32 See e.g, Jianbo Lou, Zhongguo Gongsifa Di Wu Tiao Di Yi Kuan de Wenyi Jieshi Ji Shishi Lujing [The 
Literal Interpretation and Implementation Path of Article Five Paragraph One of Chinese Company Law], 20 
PEKING U. L. J. 36 (2008). 
33  An exception is Peizhong Gan and Yu Zhou, Woguo Gongsifa Jiangou Zhong De Guojia Jiaose [The 
Role of the State in Building Corporate Law in China], 2 CONTEMP. L. REV. 56 (2014). The authors found only 
one court case referenced the term “social responsibility” and the case involved a consumer dispute with China 
Mobile, a state-owned telecommunication enterprise.  
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simply one of numerous governmental efforts to promote CSR. After the express recognition of 
CSR in the corporate statute, the Chinese government has introduced different types of measures 
– endorsing, facilitating, partnering and mandating – to promote CSR activities.34 The numerous 
CSR initiatives provide specific regulatory guidance on how to implement the broadly stated 
CSR provision in the company law. As an empirical matter, it is difficult to measure the practical 
effects of the CSR provision in isolation. Many CSR activities may be more directly attributable 
to specific regulatory measures than the general CSR provision in the corporate law.   
As in other countries, CSR reporting is probably the most visible CSR practice on the 
rise. Figure 1 shows the number of Chinese companies publishing stand-alone CSR reports 
during the period of 2006-2015.35 It shows a noticeable increase in the number of listed and non-
listed companies engaging in CSR reporting since 2006. The rise of CSR reporting in China is a 
direct result of disclosure regulations by the two stock exchanges in China.36 In 2006, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange released the Guide on Listed Companies’ Social Responsibility (here 
after “Shenzhen Guide”) with the view to further the CSR principle stated in the corporate 
statute.37  The Shenzhen Guide encourages listed companies to publish CSR reports.38 The 
Shenzhen Guide also provides principles on how a listed company shall handle its relationship 
with each of the various stakeholders. In 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange took a progressive 
                                                          
34 See Ho, supra note 19.   
35 See Syntao, A Journey To Discover Values 2015: A Study Of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
in China,http://www.syntao.com/syntao/index.php/web/report/detail?id=101. 
36 For a detailed discussion about the Chinese stock exchanges’ CSR disclosure rules and the 
implementation effects, see Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure in Emerging Securities 
Markets, 35 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 18-22 (2009). 
37 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s Guide on Listed Companies’ Social Responsibility, art. 1 (published on 
September 25, 2006) (explaining the purpose of the Guide). 
38 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s Guide on Listed Companies’ Social Responsibility, art. 36 (published 
on September 25, 2006). According to Article 36, “[c]ompanies may release their social responsibility reports along 
with their annual reports.” It also suggests that this report should contain at least the following information: “(1) 
implementation of social responsibility relating to employee protection, impact on environment, product quality and 
community relationship; (2) assessment of implementation of the Guide and reasons for the gap, if any; (3) measures 
for improvement and the timetable.”    
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approach mandating certain types of listed companies to issue annual CSR reports.39 Moreover, 
the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the 
government’s ownership agency, has required the state-owned enterprises to publish annual CSR 
reports.40   
 
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF CHINESE COMPANIES PUBLISHING STAND-ALONE CSR 
REPORTS, 2006-2015 
 
 
Source: SynTao, A Journey to Discover Values 2015: A Study of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in 
China. 
 
Another observable trend is the growth of green finance in China.41 In 2007, China 
introduced green credit policies that encourage banks to adopt environmental due diligence for 
credit management and to channel financing to environmentally friendly projects. As of June 
2017, the green credit loan balance grew to 8.22 trillion RMB. Moreover, until now, China has 
                                                          
39 Three types of companies are subject to this disclosure requirement, including: companies in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Index, companies that list shares overseas, and companies in the 
financial sector. According to information released by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 290 listed companies 
published CSR reports for the fiscal year of 2008. Of these 290 companies, 258 companies issued CSR reports due 
to the regulatory requirement while only 32 companies did so voluntarily. For more detailed information, see Lin, 
supra note 36.  
40 In 2008, SASAC released the Guiding Opinions on Central Enterprises’ Implementation of Social 
Responsibility, which required the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the central government’s control to publish 
CSR reports by 2018. In 2012, SASAC released an informal notice requiring the central SOEs to begin publishing 
CSR reports in 2012. All the central SOEs have published annual CSR reports since then. 
41 See Virginia Harper Ho, Sustainable Finance & China’s Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank 
Monitoring of Environmental Risk, 51 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 609 (2018).  
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become the world’s second largest issuer of climate-aligned bonds since its first corporate green 
bond was issued in 2015.42 
Many CSR performance instruments have emerged to measure and compare Chinese 
companies’ social and environmental performance.43 One of the leading CSR performance 
rankings is provided by the CSR Research Center of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
which was established in 2008. The center annually evaluates and ranks companies’ social and 
environmental performance based on a scheme of 150 indicators that take into account 
international standards and local situations. According to the annual evaluations over the years, 
Chinese companies have demonstrated a gradual increase in CSR performance. Most CSR 
rankings in China show that the leading performers are state-owned enterprises, especially those 
controlled by the central government.  
Absent consensus on how to measure CSR performance, any performance evaluation 
may be controversial. Still, the bottom line is that the Chinese government’s various measures 
including the CSR provision in the corporate statute have raised CSR awareness among 
companies. In this regard, the CSR principle stated in the company law may serve an expressive 
function to “reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning of action through a 
legal expression or statement about appropriate behavior.”44 However, beyond the expressive 
function, does the CSR law provide any adjudicative function?  
 
                                                          
42  See Climate Bonds Initiative and China Central Depository & Clearing Company (CCDC), CHINA 
GREEN BOND MARKET 2017, available at 
https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/China_Annual_Report_2017_EN_Final_14_02_2018.pdf. 
43 Major CSR evaluation indexes in China include: the Chinese CSR Annual Index published by Political 
Science Institute of East China University Political Science and Law, Shanghai Jiaotong University Corporate Legal 
Research Center, Eastern Public Welfare Regulation and Evaluation Center; the Chinese Corporate Social 
Responsibility Ranking published by the Southern Weekly China CSR Research Center; China’s CSR Top 500 
published by China Enterprise Evaluation Association and Tsinghua University School of Social Sciences.   
44 See Cass R. Sustein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REV 2010, 2031 (1996). 
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III. AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW OF CHINESE COURT CASES 
This article collects court cases from two authoritative and commonly used Chinese law 
databases – China Judgements Online and China Law Info. This article covers court cases that 
expressly include the term of “corporate social responsibility” or the Article 5 of China’s 
company law. The data collection was completed by the end of February 2018.  The sample 
includes 169 independent cases.45 Of the 169 cases, 91 cases expressly cite Article 5 of the 
company law. The rest explicitly reference the term of “corporate social responsibility.”  
As is true of any empirical study of court cases, this sampling method has limitations. It 
does not include cases that are resolved before the court delivers its judgment. Also, note that 
Chinese judges have been actively encouraging parties to mediate.46 Chinese courts do not 
publish cases that are finally resolved through mediation. The courts also do not publish some 
cases for a host of reasons.47 The publically available cases do not represent the universe of all 
the court cases in China. Despite the limitations, the available data provides useful insights into 
how the notion of CSR has been used by Chinese courts.  
 
A. Trend 
China introduced the term “CSR” in its company law in 2006. Figure 2 shows that there 
were only an extremely small number of cases in the first few years after the CSR legislation in 
                                                          
45 Duplicative cases are counted as one case. Cases launched by different plaintiffs based on the same facts 
are counted as one case. Decisions for the same dispute (e.g. a trial followed by an appeal) are counted as one case.  
46 See Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn against Law? 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011) (discussing China’s 
recent return to mediation and its implications).  
47 Cases involving state secrets, crimes committed by minors, custody or guardianship of children, disputes 
resolved through mediation are excluded from online publication. For a detailed discussion about the promise and 
perils of using the huge body of Chinese court cases, see Benjamin L. Liebman et al., Mass Digitization of Chinese 
Court Decisions: How to Use Text as Data in the Field of Chinese Law, 21st Century China Center Research Paper 
No. 2017-01, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-551, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985861. 
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2006. Note that the number of cases in 2017 may be under-inclusive because many cases had not 
yet been released at the time of data collection as they were still pending and there was a time lag 
between final ruling and publication. Although both of the databases cover court cases published 
as early as in the 1990s,48 no CSR cases were found before 2007. On the face of it, Figure 2 
appears to suggest a noticeable increase starting from 2013. However, the rise in the number of 
CSR cases since 2013 is probably attributable to greater data availability in both of the databases. 
The number of published civil judgements in both databases surged in 2013 and since then it has 
continued to grow remarkably.49 The number of CSR cases has a very strong and positive 
correlation with the total number of published civil judgements over the years.50 Considered the 
trivial number of CSR cases in the first few years after the 2006 CSR legislation and the slow 
growth rate of CSR cases relative to the growth rate of published civil cases over the decade,51 
the data indicates that it takes time for judges and litigants to digest the CSR law and explore 
possible legal usages.      
 
 
 
                                                          
48 China Judgements Online covers civil judgements published as early as in 1996. China Law Info covers 
civil judgements published as early as in 1990.   
49 In 2013, the number of published civil judgements in China Judgements Online was close to a million of 
cases, an increase by about 3.66 times from the previous year. China Law Info has a similar data pattern with more 
than 800,000 civil judgements published in 2013, nearly doubling the previous year’s number. Both databases show 
that since 2014 the number of published civil judgements has been several millions per year. 
50 The Pearson coeffeicent for the relationship between the annual number of CSR cases and the annual 
number of China Judgmeents Online civil cases over the period of 2006-2017 is 0.916. The Pearson coefficient for 
the relationship between the annual number of CSR cases and the annual number of China Law Info civil cases is 
0.979.  A Pearson correlation coefficient ranges between 1 and -1. The rule of thumb for interpreting the strength of 
correlation is as follows:  0 means no correlation; +.3 (-.3) indicates a weak positive (negative) relationship; +.5 (-.5) 
indicates a moderate positive (negative) relationship; +.8 (-.8) indicates a strong positive (negative) relationship; +1 
(-1) indicates a perfect positive (negative) relationship. 
51 From 2007 to 2016, the number of CSR cases increased by 42 times while the number of published civil 
judgements increased by 491 times in the China Judgements Online database and by 228 times in the China Law 
Info database.  
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FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF PUBLISHED CSR CASES, 2006-2017 
 
Note: The case publication year of the data sources started in the 1990s.  
 
 
B. Jurisdictional Distributions 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the CSR cases by the level of court.52  A majority of the 
CSR cases took place at the county or district court level. This case distribution is highly 
correlated with the distribution of total civil judgements across court levels.53 A possible and 
intuitive explanation for the correlation is that the greater number of civil cases at the lower-
court level provides a larger case pool from which CSR issues may arise.  
 
TABLE 1. CASE DISTRIBUTION BY THE LEVEL OF COURT 
Level of Court Number of Cases (Percentage) 
High Court 8 (4.7%) 
Intermediate Court 56 (33.1%) 
County/District 104 (61.6%) 
                                                          
52 When a case is appealed to a higher court that expressly considers CSR, it is counted as a higher court 
case rather than a lower court case.   
53 The Pearson correlation for the relationship between the number of CSR cases and the number of civil 
judgements by the level of courts is 0.932.  
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Special Court54 1 (0.6%) 
Total 169 (100%) 
 
Table 2 shows the provincial distribution of the CSR cases. The distribution is largely in 
proportion to the total civil cases distribution across provinces. Statistically, there is a strong 
correlation between the number of CSR cases and the number of civil cases by province.55  Still, 
some interesting patterns should be noted. In Table 2, the top five provinces account for 48.6% 
of all the CSR cases. These provinces are more economically developed regions of China. In 
addition, they have prominent presence of export-oriented private enterprises that have been 
exposed to responsible production standards in global supply chains since the 1990s. The 
relatively advanced economic development and the longer exposure to the international market 
may contribute to the growing CSR awareness and a greater likelihood to invoke CSR in the 
courtroom.   
TABLE 2. PUBLISHED CSR CASES BY PROVINCE 
Province Number of Cases (Percentage) 
Guangdong 22 (13.0%) 
Jiangsu 18 (10.7%) 
Shanghai 16 (9.5%) 
Zhejiang 15 (8.9%) 
Fujian 11 (6.5%) 
                                                          
54 The special court here is Beijing Railway Transport Court. 
55 The Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between the number of CSR cases and the 
number of civil cases by province is 0.644; the spearman rank rho is 0.723. Both correlation coefficients suggest a 
statistically significant strong positive relationship. The number of civil cases by province is drawn from China 
Judgements Online.   
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Anhui 9 (5.3%) 
Guangxi 9 (5.3%) 
Beijing 7 (4.1%) 
Hubei 6 (3.6%) 
Sichuan 6 (3.6%) 
Tianjin 6 (3.6%) 
Other 22 Jurisdictions 44 (26.0%) 
Total 169 (100%) 
 
C. Corporate Types 
Although most CSR literature focuses on public companies, only 16 (9.5%) of the CSR 
cases involve a public company. It is possible that Chinese courts declined to accept some cases 
brought against public companies that exercised political influence over the courts.56 However, 
note that there are over 180 million registered business firms in China and only about 3,500 of 
them are public companies.57 From a statistical perspective, public companies are expected to 
account for a very small portion of the court cases (the expected percentage is as little as 
0.00194%). Yet, the dataset shows that by percentage, public companies are statistically 
significantly overrepresented in the CSR cases.58  
According to CSR theories, public companies should shoulder greater social 
responsibility than non-public companies should because public companies often possess 
                                                          
56 See Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 620 CHINA Q. 631 (2007); Robin Hui 
Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-year Retrospective and Empirical Assessment, 61 
AM. J. COMP. L. 757 (2013). 
57 National Bureau of Statistics of China, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2017) Table 1-5, 
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/indexch.htm. 
58 Z-Score is 278.422; p-value is close to 0.  
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significant powers and exert impact on society.59 This view is recognized in the following case 
where the court apportioned more liability to the defendant based on its identity as a publicly 
listed company. In this case, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract to jointly develop 
and provide heating services to a residential community. The parties disputed over the validity of 
the contract termination and the associated damages. Among other rationales, the court 
explained:  
 
In terms of corporate social responsibility, the implementation of the agreement indeed 
resolved the heating service problem for the residents in the community. Considered 
factors including the corporate nature, firm size and operating environments, the 
defendant, as a publicly listed heating company, should undertake greater social 
responsibility and obligations than the plaintiff firm.60 
     
In the dataset, the public companies were often state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs 
involved in 35 of the 169 cases, representing approximately 20%. Note that the number of SOEs 
accounts for less than 1% of the total number of registered business entities in China.61 In this 
regard, SOEs had overrepresentation in the CSR cases. The prominent SOE presence may reflect 
a common expectation that SOEs shoulder special missions other than making profits and have 
                                                          
59 See Domènec Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 47-82 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (discussing CSR theories and 
noting a group of CSR theories based on corporate power). See also Min‐Dong Paul Lee, A Review of The Theories 
of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary Path And The Road Ahead, 10 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 53 
(2008) (noting that “the vast majority of CSR research focuses almost exclusively on large publicly traded 
corporations” and provides “very little reflection on what CSR means for small and medium enterprises”).  
60 See Shenyang Shi Shuanxi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yu Shenyang Huitian Redian Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 
Lian Ying Hetong Jiufen Yi Shen Minshi Panjueshu [Shenyang City Shuanxi Corporation v. Shenyang Huitian 
Thermal Power Corporation, First-Instance Civil Judgement on A Joint Venture Contract Dispute] (Shenyang 
Shenhei District People’s Court, Jan. 26, 2017) (China Judgements Online).  
61 See National Bureau of Statistics of China, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2017) Table 1-8, 
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/indexch.htm. 
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monopoly in China’s critical sectors. Chinese courts expressly stated in six cases that SOEs 
should undertake more social responsibility and thus bear legal liabilities arising from tort or 
other laws.62 For instance, in a case where an electric scooter driver was injured partly because 
China Telecom, a large state-owned telecom service provider, failed to take reasonable 
precautionary measures during its road constructions. The court attributed more fault to China 
Telecom by stating that “China Telecom, a large telecom state-owned enterprise providing the 
public with telecom services that are closely connected to people’s daily life and having a higher 
reputation and greater social impact, should bear more corporate social responsibility.”63  
  
D. Issue Types 
CSR may emerge in different types of issues, as shown in Table 3. Most CSR cases took 
place in the contract law context, particularly insurance contracts. Often, in an insurance contract 
case, the insurance policy holder as the plaintiff argued that the insurance company as the 
defendant was socially irresponsible for refusing payments. Real estate sale contracts represent 
                                                          
62 See Zhongguo Dianxin Gufen Youxian Gongsi Shanghai Fen Gongsi Su Yang Weizhong Wujian Sunhai 
Zeren Jiufen Yi An Er Shen Minshi Panjueshu [China Telecommunication Corporation’s Shanghai Branch 
Company v. Yang Weizhong, Second Instance Civil Judgement on A Property Damage Dispute] (Shanghai First 
Intermediate People’s Court, Oct. 19, 2017) (China Judgements Online); Zou Weihua Su Zhongguo Lianhe 
Wangluo Tongxin Youxian Gongsi Zhaoqing Shi Fen Gongsi Deng Gongsi Dianxin Fuwu Hetong Jiufen An [Zou 
Weihaug v. China Unicom Co., Ltd.’s Zhauqing Branch Company et al., A Telecom Services Contract Dispute] 
(Guangdong Province Zhauqing City Duanzhou District People’s Court, Nov. 7, 2014) (China Law Info); Chengdu 
Ditie Yunying Youxian Gongsi Yu Xia Hong Deng Qinquan Zeren Jiufen Shangsu An [Chengdu Metro Operation 
Co. Ltd. v. Xia Hung et al., An Appeal of Tort Liability Dispute] (Sichuan Chengdu Municipal Intermediate 
People’s Court, Sep. 18, 2016) (China Law Info); Zhao Xingyou Yu Zhongguo Gongshang Yinhang Gufen Youxian 
Gongsi Haerbin Hulan Zhihang Laodong Zhengyi Er Shen Minshi Panjueshu[Zhao Xingyo v. Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China Harbin Hulan Branch, Second Instance Civil Judgement on A Labor Dispute] 
(Heilongjiang Harbin Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Dec. 15, 2015) (China Judgements Online); Song 
Qinghai Yu Zhongguo Yidong Tongxin Jituan Chongqing Youxian Gongsi Dianxin Fuwu Hetong Jiufen An [Song 
Qinghau v. China Mobile Group Chongqing Co., Ltd., A Telecom Services Contract Dispute] (Chongqing First 
Intermediate People’s Court, Nov. 9, 2015) (China Law Info); Huizhou Shi Huiyang Gaoyu Shiye Fazhan Youxian 
Gongsi Su Zhongguo Shiyou Huagong Gufen Youxian Gongsi Guangdong Shiyou Fen Gongsi Zulin Hetong Jiufen 
An[Huizhou City Gaoyu Development Co., Ltd. v. Sinopec Guangdong Branch Corp., A Lease Contract Dispute] 
(Guangdong Provincial High Court, Jun. 20, 2014) (China Law Info).  
63 See China Telecommunication Corporation’s Shanghai Branch Company, supra note 62. 
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another area where CSR could be invoked. Usually the court or the plaintiff viewed the 
defendant real estate developer failed to undertake CSR and caused damages to homebuyers. 
Note that a few cases involved consumer contracts with telecom service providers. In such cases, 
the state-owned telecom service providers were often viewed socially irresponsible for the 
improper exercise of their monopoly powers in the market.   
 Corporate law cases represent nearly a third (29.6%) of all the CSR cases, which is 
unsurprising given that Chinese company law includes an express CSR provision. Article 5 of 
China’s company law includes two paragraphs. The first paragraph provides that “In the course 
of doing business, a company shall comply with laws, administrative regulations, conform to 
social morality, and business ethics, act in good faith, subject itself to the government and the 
public supervision, and undertake social responsibility.” The second paragraph provides that 
“The legitimate rights and interests of a company shall be protected by laws and may not be 
trespassed.” A close examination of the corporate law cases that expressly referenced Article 5 
reveals that the courts often meant to reference the part about legal compliance and legitimate 
rights protection rather than the part about social responsibility. For example, the courts often 
cited Article 5 without any explanation in piercing the corporate veil cases where shareholders 
abused the corporate form and took advantages of creditors. The courts also cited Article 5 
without any clarification in cases where statutory or internal governance procedures were not 
duly followed. These cases did not really amount to the application of CSR. Such cases at best 
indicated that legal compliance is social responsibility. However, a few cases seeking judicial 
dissolution clearly considered CSR. In these dissolution cases, the courts took CSR as an 
important factor in deciding whether to grant a judicial dissolution. The following section will 
give a more detailed discussion. 
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 Tort is another area where CSR came into play. The tort cases presented two common 
situations. One of the situations was that the defendant had made some payment to cover the 
injured plaintiff’s medical expenses or losses and the defendant refused to pay further based on 
the argument that the initial payment was simply out of CSR rather than any legal liabilities. The 
other situation was that the court denounced the corporate tortfeasor for failing to assume CSR 
and should bear legal liabilities for negligence.64  
It is no surprise to see that many cases arose in the area of labor law, as employees 
usually are an important stakeholder of CSR. A common scenario was that the plaintiff 
demanded the defendant company to compensate for wrongful dismissal or to make social 
security or other payments; in response, the defendant argued that the requested payment was a 
voluntary social responsibility rather than a legal obligation.65 A number of cases occurred in the 
area of administrative law. These cases often cited Article 5 without any clear reason except for 
legal compliance.    
Overall, the notion of CSR appeared in a variety of cases. While the CSR provision is 
included under the company law, its usage is not limited to corporate law issues but a wide range 
of legal topics. The diversity of legal issues suggests that different stakeholders in different 
                                                          
64 See e.g., Qin Yidong and Ceng Pinwen Tigong Laowu Zhe Shouhai Zeren Jiufen Er Shen Minshi 
Panjueshu [Second-Instance Civil Judgement on Qing Yidong and Zeng Pinwen’s Labor Liability Dispute] 
(Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Baise City Intermediate People’s Court, Oct. 25, 2017) (China Judgements 
Online). 
65 See e.g., Tianjin Pengzhou Dianzi Youxian Gongsi Su Zhang Ling Deng Laodong Zhengyi An [Tianjin 
Pengzhou Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Zhang Ling et al., A Labor Dispute] (Tianjin Binhai Xin District People’s Court, 
Sep. 27, 2016) (China Law Info); Guangxi Nanning Dongtang Xinkai Tangye Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhumouying Fuli 
Daiyu Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjueshu [Guangxi Nanning Dongtang Xinkaitang Co., Ltd. v. Zhu Mo Ying, First-
Instance Civil Judgment on A Benefits Dispute] (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Heng County People’s 
Court, Nov. 11, 2013) (China Judgements Online); [Li Chuanfeng v. Zhongcheng Xinxing Oil Fields Engineering 
Technology Corp. Ltd, First-Instance Civil Judgement on A Labor Dispute] (Beijing Changping District People’s 
Court, Jan. 18, 2016) (China Judgements Online); Huo Yuxia Yu Xi’an Kaiwei Shiye Youxian Gongsi Laodong 
Zhengyi Yi Shen Minshi Panjueshu [Huo Yuxia v. Xi’an Kaiwei Industrial Ltd., First-Instance Civil Judgement on 
A Labor Dispute] (Xi’an Yanta District People’s Court, Jun. 15, 2017) (China Judgements Online). 
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contexts may invoke CSR in different ways. It further evidences the difficulty to standardize 
CSR behavior.  
TABLE 3. REPORTED CSR CASES BY ISSUE TYPE 
Issue Type Number of Cases (Percentage) 
Contract Law  
                   Insurance  13 (7.7%) 
                  Real Estate Sale 10 (5.9%) 
                  Loan 7 (4.1%) 
                  Lease  5 (3.0%) 
                  Telecom Service 3 (1.8%) 
                  Miscellaneous (excluding labor/employment) 28 (16.6%) 
Corporate Law  
                  Corporate Abuse  17 (10.1%) 
                  Dissolution 4 (2.4%) 
                  Verification of Shareholder Status 4 (2.4%) 
                  Validity of Shareholder Resolution 9 (5.3%) 
                  Return of Corporate Records 5 (3.0%) 
                  Miscellaneous 11 (6.5%) 
Tort  21 (12.4%) 
Labor/Employment Law 23 (13.6%) 
Administrative Law 8 (4.7%) 
Property Law 1 (0.6%) 
Total 169 (100%) 
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E. Usages 
Perhaps, the most important empirical dimension is the legal usage of the CSR 
legislation. How has the CSR law been applied in court cases? Has the CSR law affected any 
legal outcome of a case? As Table 4 shows, the court cases in the dataset demonstrate five usages 
by who applies CSR and how the term is used: tactical, compliance, exhortatory, consequential 
and evidentiary. The five types of usages are not mutually exclusive. They may co-exist in one 
case. For instance, a case may simultaneously demonstrate tactical, exhortatory and evidentiary 
usages.  
TABLE 4.  TYPES OF CSR USAGES 
Type of Usage User Number of Cases (Percentage) 
Tactical Plaintiff / Defendant 53 (31.4%) 
Compliance Court 100 (59.2%) 
Exhortatory Court 12 (7.1%) 
Consequential Court 4 (3.6%) 
Evidentiary Miscellaneous 10 (5.9%) 
 
Note: Percentage is calculated with the denominator as 169 cases in the dataset. 
 
1. Tactical 
 Often the courts initiated the application of CSR. However, plaintiffs and defendants 
sometimes invoked CSR. Table 4 shows 53 cases where plaintiffs or defendants used CSR as 
part of their arguments. In more detail, plaintiffs relied on CSR to support their arguments in 21 
cases and defendants used CSR as a defensive tool in 32 cases. Plaintiffs usually argued 
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defendants’ behavior as being socially irresponsible. Defendants often argued that the liability 
that plaintiffs attempted to impose was a voluntary social responsibility rather than a legally 
binding obligation.66 In cases where plaintiffs invoked CSR, 57.1% of the plaintiffs won. In 
comparison, in cases where defendants invoked CSR, the defendants’ win rate was only 37.5%.    
Of the 53 tactical cases, only seven cases expressly referenced Article 5 of the corporate 
statute. Plaintiffs and defendants tended to use CSR quite liberally rather than strictly relating to 
any particular statutory or regulatory provision. They showed creative efforts in elaborating or 
expanding the meaning of CSR in their own favor. For instance, a defendant corporation invoked 
CSR to argue that the plaintiff’s request to characterize its investment as a shareholder loan 
rather than equity interests would be against CSR. The defendant stated: 
 
…In terms of stakeholders of corporate social responsibility, the corporation is 
responsible to not only the conventional stakeholder, i.e. shareholders, but also other 
stakeholders. The stakeholders include consumers, employees, suppliers, communities, 
social groups, the government, etc….Such responsibility bearers include not only the 
corporation but also its founding shareholders….The corporation currently owes tens of 
millions of dollars in employee wages, construction fees, taxes and other liabilities. If 
other shareholders follow suit to turn equity into debt through litigation, it will cause 
panic to the corporation’s creditors…. Shareholders invest in the corporation for making 
a profit, but profit is not the only purpose. When the corporation is in difficulty, how do 
shareholders balance social responsibility and personal interests? …. Shareholders should 
                                                          
66 It includes 15 cases where the plaintiff demanded more compensation from the defendant corporation 
and the defendant corporation argued that it already paid the plaintiff simply out of CSR rather than any legal 
liability. The defendant corporation argued that it had no legal liability to the plaintiff from the beginning.  
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not turn equity into debt through litigation, which is obviously a shirking of social 
responsibility.67 [emphasis added by author] 
 
In this case, the defendant expanded the entities undertaking CSR to include not only the 
corporation but also founding shareholders. However, the court disagreed with the defendant and 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff based on other legal reasons without considering the CSR 
argument.     
 
2. Compliance 
The most common usage by the court is to treat legal compliance as CSR, as shown in 
Table 4. Of the 100 compliance cases, 80 cases cited Article 5 of China’s corporate statute. Legal 
compliance is the minimum social responsibility. Article 5 of China’s company law makes it 
clear that the corporation has responsibility to comply with the law and further do more than 
what the law requires. In the dataset, a majority of the cases referenced Article 5 without 
providing any reasoning. A close examination of these cases appears to suggest that the purpose 
of the reference to Article 5 was to support the view that the corporation had an obligation to 
comply with the law and the corporation failed to do it.  
In contract law cases, the courts often viewed Article 5 in the company law as a parallel 
to the legal compliance and good faith principles of Articles 6 and 7 in the contract law.       
Article 6 of China’s Contract Law provides that “The parties shall observe the principle of 
honesty and good faith in exercising their rights and performing their obligations.” Article 7 
                                                          
67 See Han Renfa Yu Changzhou Xinhongrui Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Minjian Jiedai Jiufen An [Han Fenfa 
v. Changzhou Xinhongrui Properties Co., Ltd., A Loan Dispute] (Jiangsu Changzhou City Intermediate People’s 
Court, May 17, 2017) (China Judgements Online). 
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provides that “In concluding and performing a contract, the parties shall comply with the laws 
and administrative regulations, respect social ethics, and shall not disrupt the social and 
economic order or impair the public interests.”  
Although the courts in many cases only implied legal compliance as CSR, the courts in a 
few cases explicitly stated that compliance with the law is a legal duty as well as a social 
responsibility. For example, a transportation corporation denied any employment relationship 
with an adjunct driver and therefore refused to undertake any social security obligations. In this 
case, the court stated that “[Article 5 of the transportation regulation] prohibits any adjunct 
operation of passenger vehicles. The purpose of the regulation is to protect safety of passengers 
and third parties and to assure public interests in society. The corporation that illegally allowed 
adjunct drivers shirked corporate social responsibility and should be punished according to the 
law.”68 In another case where the defendant corporation refused to make any social security 
payments for a long-term employee, the court stated that “It is necessary to point out that 
employers are an important participating force in the social security system. Timely and 
sufficient payment of social security charges for employees is the corporation’s legal obligation 
as well as a representation of corporate social responsibility.”69 
The observation that a great majority of the CSR cases in the dataset viewed legal 
compliance as part of CSR is consistent with the minimal consensus in the scholarly debate of 
CSR. Legal compliance is the least controversial part of CSR.  
                                                          
68 See Zhongqing Gongmao Shiye (Jituan) Youxian Zeren Gongsi Yu Zhongqing Shi Jiangbei Qu Renli 
Ziyuan He Shehui Baozhang Ju Xingzheng Queren Er Shen Xingzheng Panjueshu [Chongqing Industry & Trade 
Industry (Group) Co., Ltd. v. Chongqing Municipality Jiangbei District Human Resources and Social Security, 
Second-Instance Administrative Judgement] (Chongqing Municipal First Intermediate People’s Court, May 20, 
2016) (China Judgements Online). 
69 See Shamen Shi Bisite Shizhuang Youxian Gongsi Yu Shamen Shi Shehui Baoxian Guanli Zhongxin 
Xingzheng Panjueshu An [Xiamen Bisite Fashion Co., Ltd. v. Xiamen Municipal Social Security Management 
Center, An Administrative Judgement] (Fujian Province Xiamen City Simin District People’s Court, Dec. 1, 2014) 
(China Law Info). 
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3. Exhortatory 
It is commonly expected that CSR as a vague concept can at best serve an expressive or 
educational function if it is expressly incorporated into law. It may only raise CSR awareness 
and encourage companies to act in a more socially and environmentally responsible manner. In 
12 cases, the courts indeed took the opportunity to exhort companies to engage in CSR activities. 
For instance, in a case where the company automated its parking lot management and as a 
result terminated the employment relationship with its redundant employees who assisted 
payment collection, the employees sued for compensation on the basis that the termination was 
illegal. The court stated:  
 
It is necessary to point out that technological advancement may lead to reduction in labor 
costs and as a result, workers may lose their jobs. However, employers should undertake 
corporate social responsibility and should not lose its very basic sense of responsibility to 
workers while enjoying the maximization of economic interests arising from 
technological development. Thus, this court hereby exhorts the company to take people at 
the foremost in the employment process and adequately balance the relationship between 
corporate development and employee interests.70      
 
In another case, a corporation managed a dam for fishing and entertainment purposes. 
The company and the local farming community reached an agreement in which the company had 
                                                          
70 See Beijing Shijie Cheng Wuye Guanli Youxian Gongsi Shenqing Laodong Zhengyi Shensu Shenqing 
Yi An [Beijing World City Property Management Co., Ltd.’s Labor Dispute Application] (Beijing Superior People’s 
Court, Sep. 29, 2016) (China Law Info). 
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to ensure the water supply for the community. In a drought year, the local community sued the 
company for failing to honor the contract. The court ruled that the company failed to perform its 
obligations stipulated in the contract. At the end of its ruling, the court further advised:     
  
In addition, in nowadays, corporate social responsibility has been gradually rooted in 
people’s hearts and internalized as a key factor for the corporation’s sustainable, long-
term and healthy development. The Article 5 of China’s Company Law and the Article 7 
of China’s Partnership Enterprise Law also highlight the importance of corporate social 
responsibility. Thus, this court reminds the [defendant] corporation to try its best to 
balance the relationship between profitability and social responsibility while legally 
operating its business, thereby increasing its long-term competitiveness. 71             
 
Often the courts praised the defendant’s voluntary compensation to the plaintiff as CSR 
behavior.72 For instance, the plaintiff, who was hired by a subcontractor and was injured in the 
course of performing his duties, tried to hold the subcontractor and the contractor jointly and 
                                                          
71 See Beijing Dadi Yujia Shengtai Luyou Kaifa Youxian Gongsi Deng Yu Beijing Shi Huairou Qu 
Changshaoying Manzu Xiang Dadi Cun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Hetong Jiufen Shangsu An [Beijing Dadi Yujia 
Ecological Travel Development Co., Ltd. v. Beijing Huairo District Shaoyingmenzu Village Committee, An Appeal 
of Contract Dispute] (Beijing City Third Intermediate People’s Court, Dec. 13, 2016) (China Law Info). 
72 See e.g.,Wang Bing Yu Guangzhou Shi Yifanju Zhuangshi Gongcheng Youxian Gongsi, Guangzhou 
Yangxin Zhaoming Youxian Gongsi, Wu Wancai Tigong Laowuzhe Shouhai Zeren Jiufen An [Wang Bing v. 
Guangzhou City Yifanju Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd. et al., A Labor Liability Dispute] (Guangdong 
Guangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Jul. 20, 2016) (China Law Info); Dalian Mingyang Chuanyong 
Dianqi Youxian Gongsi Yu Mao Jianhua, Shao Lijiang Shengming Quan Jiankang Quan, Shenti Quan Jiufen An 
[Dalian Minyang Marine Electrics Joint Stock Limited Company v. Mao Jianhua et al., A Dispute on Life, Health 
and Personal Rights] (Liaoning Province Dalian Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Aug. 10 2016) (China Law 
Info); Zhong Cai Jieneng Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhong Tie Ershisan Ju Jituan Chuandong Shuini Youxian 
Gongsi, Zhong Tie Ershisan Ju Jituan Youxian Gongsi Hetong Jiufen An [Sinoma Energy Joint Stock Limited 
Company v. China Railway 23th Bureau Group Chuandong Cement Co. Ltd. et al., A Contract Dispute] (Tianjin 
First Intermediate People’s Court, Feb. 2, 2016) (China Law Info)]; Ding Yuanchen, Zhong Jiao Tianjin Gangwan 
Gongcheng Sheji Yuan Youxian Gongsi Laodong Hetong Jiufen Er Shen Minshi Panjueshu [Ding Yuanchen v. 
Tianjin Port Engineering Design and Consulting Co. Ltd. of First Harbor Engineering Group, Second-Instance Civil 
Judgement on A Labor Contract Dispute] (Tianjin Second Intermediate People’s Court, Oct. 25, 2017) (China 
Judgements Online). 
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severally liable. The court ruled that the subcontractor as the employer should be liable. 
However, the court refused to hold the contractor liable given it had no fault. The court further 
explained: 
 
The contractor, based on corporate social responsibility and the humanitarian principle, 
signed the emergency assistance agreement with the plaintiff in order to provide help to 
the plaintiff. This agreement is not against any law, and instead it should be encouraged. 
Therefore, the court does not support the plaintiff’s request to revoke the agreement and 
hold the contractor jointly and severally liable.73   
 
4. Consequential 
What is most exciting to see is that the courts in four cases explicitly used CSR as an 
important factor in determining the legal outcome. The four cases expressly considered the CSR 
provision in the corporate statute.  
One case in the dataset shows that a lower court imposed liability on a defendant solely 
based on Article 5 of the company law. In this case, an employee was on leave for mental 
treatment. The employer did not pay any wages during the leave. As a result, the employee 
applied to the local government’s labor dispute arbitration committee. The committee rejected 
the case because the period of the statute of limitations had elapsed. The employee appealed to 
the court for remedy. The lower court ruled:  
 
                                                          
73 See Wang Bing, supra note 72. 
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According to Article 5 of the Company Law of People’s Republic of China, the 
corporation in the course of doing business shall conform to social morality and business 
ethics, act in good faith, and undertake social responsibility. In this case, the plaintiff’s 
claim is not supported by the law because of the elapse of the statute of limitations. 
However, the plaintiff had worked for the defendant company and made a certain 
contribution to the corporation; moreover, the plaintiff now is mentally ill, financially 
difficult, and in need of financial supports. Therefore, from the perspectives of 
humanitarianism and corporate social responsibility, this court exercises its discretion and 
orders the defendant company to make a sustentation payment of $35,000 to the 
plaintiff.74     
 
The defendant appealed. The higher court overturned the lower’s court decision by providing: 
  
The Company Law is the law that regulates corporate organization and behavior. Its 
Article 5 provides that “In the course of doing business, a company shall comply with 
laws and administrative regulations, conform to social morality and business ethics, act in 
good faith, subject itself to the government and the public supervision, and undertake 
social responsibility.” This provision is the legal principle with regard to the 
corporation’s social responsibility. It requires the corporation, as a business entity and as 
a social member, to undertake social responsibilities, such as responsibilities of assisting 
employment, maintaining economic order, paying taxes by law, paying employees’ social 
                                                          
74 See Dai Ping, Tang De Dianzi(Zhongguo) Youxian Gongsi Laodong Hetong Jiufen Er Shen Minshi 
Panjueshu [Dai Ping v. Tangde Electronic (China) Co., Ltd., Second-Instance Civil Judgement on A Labor Contract 
Dispute] (Guangdong Huizhou Municipal Intermediate Peoples’ Court, Jun. 21, 2011) (China Judgements Online). 
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insurance by law, maintaining employee’s legal rights and interests, protecting the 
environment, etc. In other words, the beneficiaries of corporate social responsibility are 
unspecific; at least [CSR] is for the general interests of stakeholder groups. However, 
this case is a labor contract dispute. The lower court applied Article 5 of the company law 
to force the defendant company to make a sustentation payment of $35,000 from the 
perspectives of humanitarianism and corporate social responsibility, which is an incorrect 
application of the law….During the appeal period, the defendant company expressed 
sympathy to the plaintiff and from the perspective of humanitarianism voluntarily agreed 
to pay $20,000 to the plaintiff for assistance. Given that the defendant was voluntary to 
assist the plaintiff, this court permitted the payment.75 [emphasis added by author]       
 
The higher court opinion suggests that CSR is not a duty owed to any particular 
stakeholder such as an employee but a duty owed to overall stakeholders. This interpretation 
raises a question about who has standing to bring an action under Article 5. Who can represent 
the general interests of stakeholder groups? This interpretation may significantly restrict the 
practical use of Article 5 in lawsuits.   
In the dataset, the most insightful use of CSR probably arose in the context of judicial 
dissolution of a corporation. China’s Company Law provides that “Whereas a company 
encounters serious management difficulties so that its continuance will result in significant losses 
to shareholders’ interests and the difficulties cannot be resolved by any other means, holders of 
at least ten percent voting shares of the company may apply to court for dissolution.”76 The 
Supreme People’s Court of China issued an interpretation on how to apply the judicial 
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 Chinese Company Law (2005), art. 183; Chinese Company Law (2013), art. 182. 
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dissolution provision. According to the Supreme Court, courts should accept the application 
when the company encounters serious management difficulties and one of the following occurs: 
(1) the company has been unable to hold any shareholder meeting for two years or more; (2) 
shareholders have been unable to pass any effective resolutions due to failing to meet the 
required votes specified in the statute or the articles of incorporation; (3) the board has prolonged 
conflicts which cannot be resolved through shareholder meetings; or (4) any other serious 
management difficulties that make the company’s continuous existence detrimental to 
shareholders’ interests. 77 The last category gives courts broad discretion in making a judicial 
dissolution order.  
In the dataset, four cases involved a plaintiff seeking a corporate dissolution ordered by 
the court. In one case, the defendant company argued against the dissolution because it would 
affect a large number of customers’ interests and cause social instability. The court declined to 
order a dissolution on other grounds without any express consideration about the CSR 
argument.78 However, in the other three cases, the courts expressly took CSR as an important 
factor when determining whether to order a dissolution.79 For instance, in one case, the company 
was a real estate developer owned by two shareholders. The company took over a project to 
                                                          
77 See Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company 
Law of the People's Republic of China (II), No.6 [2008] of the Supreme People’s Court, effective of May 19, 2008; 
revised on Feb. 17, 2014.  
78 See Chen Lianming Deng Su Hainan Hongweide Shiye Youxian Gongsi Jiesan Jiufen An [Chen 
Minglian et al. v. Hainan Hongweide Industrial Co., Ltd., A Corporate Dissolution Dispute] (Hainan Haikou 
Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Dec. 11, 2013) (China Law Info). Note that this case falls into the tactical 
category rather than the consequential category because it was the defendant, not the court, who used CSR.   
79  See Li Ping, Huang Shaohua Deng Yu Wuhan Shi Hannan Qu Liaoyuan Yunshu Youxian Zeren Gongsi 
Gongsi Jiesan Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjueshu [Li Ping et al., v. Wuhan City Hanan District Liaoyuan 
Transportation Co. Ltd., First-Instance Civil Judgement on A Corporate Dissolution Dispute] (Hubei Wuhan City 
Hanan District People’s Court Jul. 28, 2017) (China Judgements Online); Li Xiuzhen Yu Qingdao Jiesheng Zhiye 
Youxian Gongsi, Xue Xiaoming Gongsi Jiesan Jiufen An [Li Xiuzhen v. Qingdao Jieshang Properties Co., Ltd. and 
Xue Xiaoming, A Corporate Dissolution Dispute] (Shangdong High People’s Court, Oct. 23, 2015); Suzhou Shi 
Huguan Xinli Wuhuajiao Youxian Gongsi Deng Su Yan Xinsen Deng Gongsi Jiesan Jiufen An [Suzhou Huguan 
Xinli Wuhuajiao Company et al., v. Yan Xinsen et al., A Corporate Dissolution Dispute] (Jiangsu Suzhou Municipal 
Intermediate People’s Court, Mar. 20, 2013) (China Law Info). 
37 
 
build over 560 condominium units that had already been sold to the public. Upon a shareholder’s 
application, the lower court granted a dissolution on the basis that shareholders had serious 
conflicts and were unable to make any effective shareholder resolution for more than two years. 
However, the higher court overturned the lower’s decision and instead held:  
 
Article 5 of the Company Law expressly provides that the corporation in the course of 
doing business shall act in good faith, subject itself to the government and the public 
supervision, and undertake social responsibility. As a result, when determining whether 
to dissolve a company, the court shall not only consider shareholders’ interests but also 
sufficiently take into account the impact on the public interests of the society. In this 
case, the company is in the real estate business, involving a large number of 
homebuyers….If the company dissolves at this moment, it will be unable to carry on the 
obligations to complete the subsequent construction work and property transfers. As a 
result, it will affect the normal project development and obstruct the realization of the 
legal interests of a large number of homebuyers, resulting in mass petitions [shangfang] 
and social instability.80    
  
In another case, the court expressly shared a similar concern. 81 The court refused to order 
a dissolution partly because the corporation was a transportation company that played an 
important role in providing transportation services in the jurisdiction and had a large number of 
employees. The court held that the dissolution, if granted, would be detrimental to market 
stability.  
                                                          
80 See Li Xiuzhen, supra note 79. 
81 See Li Ping et al., supra note 79.  
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Note that both of the above cases affected a large number of stakeholders such as 
customers and employees. The large number matters, particularly within China’s political 
context.82 The Chinese government takes social stability necessary to maintain its ruling.83 Any 
negative impact on the interests of a large number of stakeholders may cause social instability, 
which is against the government’s interests. The large number carries significant weight for the 
meaning of the public interests of the society. The flipside suggests that courts are more likely to 
grant a dissolution when it only affects a small number of stakeholders. The dataset provides an 
illuminating case where the court granted a dissolution with an express explanation why CSR 
was not a concern in this particular context. In this case, the court provided that the negative 
effects on the employees would be minimal and could be mitigated by other means especially 
given that the company had only three employees and two of them were about to retire within a 
year.84       
 
5. Evidentiary 
CSR appeared quite often in evidentiary instruments submitted to courts to support a 
party’s claim. The evidential instruments included corporate codes of conduct, contracts that 
incorporated CSR standards, and administrative orders issued by governmental bureaus. While 
these cases do not directly use CSR as a legal argument, they provide some evidence that CSR 
has been incorporated in many legal practices. 
                                                          
82 See Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bonded to the State: A Network Perspective on China’s 
Corporate Bond Market, 3 J. FIN. REG. 1 (2017) (showing that an important motivation for the no-default norm in 
China’s corporate bond market is “too many (bondholders) to fail (TMTF)” based on the Chinese Communist 
Party’s overriding concern for social stability). 
83  “Stability maintenance” has been the Chinese government’s top priority. It has a comprehensive system 
to maintain social order. See Yuhua Wang and Carl Minzer, The Rise of the Chinese Security State, 222 CHINA Q. 
339 (2015).  
84 See Suzhou Huguan Xinli Wuhuajiao Company et al., supra note 79. 
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An important initiative of the modern CSR movement is that CSR has been incorporated 
into commercial contracts and has become a contractual obligation.85 The contractualization of 
CSR may be observed in a couple of cases.86 For instance, a corporation hired a consulting 
company to help it comply with the Walt Disney Company’s “Social Responsibility, Human 
Rights and ESH Audit and Evaluation Standards.” The company failed to pass Disney’s audit 
and as a result, Disney revoked its manufacturing authorization. The company sued the 
consulting company for damages. The court found that the consulting firm provided perfunctory 
services and failed to give any meaningful guidance on how to pass Disney’s audit.87 This case 
epitomizes a long-observed problem of unqualified certification providers in China’s CSR 
assurance services market.88  
In addition, the dataset provides examples where Chinese companies adopted internal 
codes of conduct consistent with CSR.89 For instance, a food chain company (the defendant) 
established its internal rules to ensure food safety. According to the rules, an employee’s failure 
to remove expired foods from the store shelves would be a serious breach of the employment 
agreement and could result in employment termination. The plaintiff who was discharged based 
                                                          
85 See Lin, supra note 16. 
86 See Xinke (Foshan) Baozhuang Youxian Gongsi Yu Shenzhen Xinyi Qiye Guanli Zixun Youxian Gongsi 
Fuwu Hetong Jiufen An [Xinke (Foshan) Packaging Company v. Shenzhen Xinyinlong Enterprise Management 
Consulting Company, A Service Contract Dispute] (Guangdong Foshan City Shuande District People’s Court, Feb. 
15, 2016) (China Law Info); Beijing Guozheng Baihong Wangluo Xinxi Jishu Youxian Gongsi Yu Beijing Zhongtie 
Dadu Gongcheng Youxian Gongsi, Tian Long Deng Hetong Jiufen Er Shen Minshi Panjueshu [Beijing Guozheng 
Baihong Internet Information Technology Company v. Beijing China Railway Dadu Engineering Company et al., 
Second-Instance Civil Judgement on A Contract Dispute] (Beijing Municipal Second Intermediate People’s Court, 
Jun. 26, 2017) (facts showing that the parties entered into a strategic cooperation agreement which required one of 
the parties comply with the law and undertake associated social responsibility when performing its contractual 
obligations). 
87 See Xinke (Foshan) Packaging Company, supra note 86. 
88 See Lin, supra note 17, at 344-347. 
89 See e.g., Chen Mouji Yu Zhuhai Xingfa Shoudai Chang Youxian Gongsi Laodong Hetong Jiufen Er 
Shen Minshi Panjueshu [Chen Mou Ji v. Zhuhai  Xingfa Handbag Factory Company, Second-Instance Civil 
Judgement on A Labor Contract Dispute] (Guangdong Zhuhai Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Apr. 6, 2016) 
(China Judgements Online); Wang Shemei Su Shanghai Laiyifen Shipin Liansuo Jingying Youxian Gongsi Laodong 
Hetong Jiufen An [Wang  Shemei v. Shanhai Yilai Food Chain Company, A Labor Contract Dispute] (Shanghai 
Songjiag District People’s Court, Aug. 1, 2014) (China Law Info). 
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on the rules challenged the dismissal. The court supported the defendant company and held that 
“the defendant’s enactment of the internal rules that strictly require employees to take care of 
food safety is an embodiment of corporate social responsibility…and consistent with 
fundamental interests of the public.”90    
The court cases also revealed that Chinese regulators played an important role in 
promoting CSR particularly tied with the idea of social stability.91 For instance, when a company 
planned to lay off its employees, it should submit a notice to the relevant bureaus. The 
government’s response notice typically reminded that the corporation should try its best to avoid 
any layoffs and if a layoff would be unavoidable, the corporation should “make a timely payment 
in full amount of wages and economic compensation, and should sufficiently undertake 
corporate social responsibility, protect labor rights and maintain labor relationships and social 
stability.”92    
 
F.  Summary 
Some general patterns may be observed from the court cases in China. First, the CSR law 
presents not only expressive and exhortatory functions but also adjudicative value. Chinese 
courts have taken CSR as an important factor in the determination of a judicial dissolution under 
the corporate law. Moreover, some courts have used CSR among other legal grounds to impose 
                                                          
90 See Wang Shemei, supra note 89. 
91 See e.g., Lian Guoxin Yu Shanghai Shi Huanqiu Lengdong Ji Chang Jingji Buchangjin Jiufen Er Shen 
Minshi Panjueshu [Lian Guozin v. Shanghai City Global Refrigerator Factory, Second-Instance Judgement on An 
Economic Compensation Dispute] (Shanghai Municipal Second Intermediate People’s Court, Jul. 22, 2014) (China 
Judgements Online); Shanghai Minxing Yingtenai Guoji Zhiye Baozhuang Youxian Gongsi Su Feng Yuchang 
Laodong Hetong Jiufen Yi An Er Shen Minshi Panjueshu [Shanghai Minxing Yingtenai International Paper 
Packaging Company v. Fong Yuchang, Second-Instance Civil Judgement on A Labor Contract Dispute] (Shanghai 
First Intermediate People’s Court, Nov. 24, 2015); Jin Guangming Su Tianyu Jianshe Youxian Gongsi Deng Jianshe 
Gongcheng Fenbao Hetong Jiufen An [Jin Guangmin v. Tianyu Construction Company et al., A Dispute on 
Construction Subcontracting] (Hangzhou Bingjiang District People’s Court, Jan. 7, 2014) (China Law Info). 
92 See e.g., Shanghai Minxing Yingtenai International Paper Packaging Company, supra note 91. 
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legal liabilities arising outside the corporate law. Still, the CSR provision under the corporate 
statute itself does not constitute an independent cause of action. Second, the meaning of CSR is 
tied with the social, economic and political realities in China. In particular, courts have viewed 
maintaining social stability as part of CSR, a view consistent with the government’s political 
policy. In addition, courts have expressly expected that state-owned enterprises should undertake 
greater social responsibility as they exercise dominant powers in many sectors of China’s 
economy. Third, while existing CSR literature mainly focuses on public companies, most of the 
court cases are concerned about closely held corporations. This empirical study indicates that 
CSR is legally relevant to not only public companies but also private firms. Fourth, while the 
CSR provision under the company law is stipulated as a behavioral standard for companies, it is 
also a review standard for the court. Some courts have creatively applied CSR when exercising 
their equitable power to grant judicial dissolutions. The implementation of CSR requires not only 
socially responsible behavior of corporations but also social consciousness of courts. In addition, 
CSR has been creatively used by not only courts but also plaintiffs and defendants. In some 
cases, plaintiffs and defendants invoked CSR to impose liability on the other party or avoid 
liability for themselves. Finally, CSR may intersect with fundamental legal concepts such as 
good faith and public policy in contract law. In practice, legal compliance remains the major part 
of CSR in China. 
 
IV. EVALUATION 
A.    Comparative Law Perspectives 
The emergence of CSR law is related to two big debates in the field of comparative 
corporate governance since the turn of the century: whether different national corporate 
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governance systems will convergence on a single shareholder-centered model, and whether legal 
origins matter. The analytical frameworks of these debates rely on taxonomies of countries. In 
the convergence debate, scholars separate the world into the shareholder-oriented and 
stakeholder-oriented regimes. In the legal origin debate, the seminal work divides the world into 
the common law countries (i.e. countries of the English origin) and the civil law countries (i.e. 
countries of the French, German, Scandinavian origins). The common law regime corresponds to 
the shareholder-oriented model while the civil law regime is oriented toward the stakeholder 
model. The stakeholder-oriented model allows non-shareholders such as employees to have 
institutionalized powers within corporate governance structure. The civil law model is viewed as 
prioritizing the rights of the state over the rights of private property owners.93 Accordingly, it is 
postulated that stakeholder-oriented/civil law countries are more likely to give legal recognition 
of CSR. China provides a good example for this proposition. Its corporate governance system 
recognizes board representation by employees. China is often characterized as “state capitalism” 
in which the state exercises comprehensive powers through different institutional channels to 
drive the market toward its favored ends.94 Yet, not all countries that have adopted a version of 
(ostensibly) mandatory CSR law fit the hypothesis. For instance, Mauritius, which requires all 
companies to allocate funds for CSR activities, has a hybrid legal system based on the French 
Code Napolean and the British common law and it remains a member of the Commonwealth.95 
                                                          
93 See Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 
(2003).  
94 See e.g., Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013).  
95 In 2009, the Mauritian government amended the Income Tax Act 1995 to require all companies to set up 
a fund equivalent to two percent of profits of the preceding year for permitted CSR activities. In 2016, the 
government revisited its CSR policy and announced a new CSR framework. The government created the National 
CSR Foundation jointly managed by the public and private sectors. Under the new rules, every company in every 
year is required to set up a CSR fund equivalent to two per cent of its chargeable income of the preceding year and 
at least 50% (75% starting from 2018) of its CSR fund shall be remitted to the National CSR Foundation. After 
contributing the requisite amount to the National CSR Foundation, companies are allowed to manage the remaining 
CSR money according to their own CSR policies. The money endowed to the National CSR Foundation will be 
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India is a common law country of the English origin. India’s move toward the stakeholder 
perspective was partly influenced by the United Kingdom’s recent turn to the enlightened 
shareholder approach that requires directors to consider impact on stakeholders while pursing 
shareholders’ interests.96 That is, even a traditional model country of shareholder wealth 
maximization is shifting. The recent emergence of the CSR law is a telling piece of evidence that 
the shareholder-centered model has not won out over the alternative(s).  
Although the CSR law that recently emerged in developing countries is not simply a legal 
transplant but carries some elements of indigenous innovation, the transplant experience of 
similarly vague fiduciary duties in civil law countries is illuminating for the newly minted CSR 
law. As Professors Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaupt noted, a successful transplant requires 
“macro-fit” and “micro-fit.”97 Macro fit is how well the concerning law complements the 
existing political-economic institutions in the country. Micro fit is how well the concerning law 
complements the existing legal infrastructure. The Chinese experience suggests the CSR law has 
some macro and micro fit with the current institutional conditions of China.   
As to macro fit, CSR coincides with China’s developmental needs. China is seeking to 
transform itself into a technology-intensive economy in which employees are valuable assets and 
environmental quality is essential to attract talent. Additionally, CSR is consistent with Chinese 
                                                          
channeled to programs in six priority areas: poverty alleviation; educational support; social housing; assistance to 
persons with severe disabilities; dealing with health problems resulting from substance abuse and poor sanitation; 
family protection. For an overview of the CSR legislative development in Mauritius, see Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development of the Republic of Mauritius, The New Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Framework, 
available at http://mof.govmu.org/English/Documents/New%20CSR%20Franework%202016.pdf. The relevant 
statutory provisions include Section 50L, Section 27(n), Sixth Schedule and Tenth Schedule under the Finance Act 
(2016). For research about CSR development in Mauritius, see Renginee Pillay, THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CSR AND DEVELOPMENT – THE CASE OF MAURITIUS (2015). 
96 See Afsharipour, supra note 8. For the UK development, see Thomas Clarke, The Long Road to 
Reformulating the Understanding of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, 38 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 433 (2015); Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United 
Kingdom's 'Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 (2007). 
97 See Hideki Kanda and Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary 
Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003). 
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government’s political interests in social stability.98 Unemployment, unsafe food, environmental 
degradation may bring large-scale protests that threaten the stability of the government’s ruling. 
The CSR law has a political backing from the state. This political support is important especially 
where the state directs significant economic resources and enforcement apparatus. The state 
interests motivate courts to raise CSR concerns when exercising judicial powers.    
As to micro fit, the judicial application of the highly vague CSR law puts great demands 
on legal infrastructure. The groundwork includes practical legal proceedings such as derivative 
actions and oppression remedies; incentives for plaintiffs and attorneys to bring actions; judges 
and attorneys (probably plaintiffs and defendants as well) familiar with the application of 
broadly stated principles rather than narrow bright-line rules; courts capable of fashioning 
remedies without clear judicial guidance.99 It requires courts to possess adequate capacity to 
apply the law. The empirical evidence in this article suggests that Chinese courts have certain 
capacity to handle the vague CSR law. As some empirical studies have found elsewhere, Chinese 
courts have been quite competent in dealing with cases that require the exercise of equity and 
discretion, such as cases involving fiduciary duties, piercing the corporate veil and oppression 
actions.100 These related practical experiences provide the courts with complementary skills to 
apply the CSR law. In this regard, as more experiences that are relevant accumulate over time, 
Chinese courts will be more capable to apply the law in the future. As shown in the empirical 
findings, until now the meaningful application of the CSR law remains very limited. To assist 
lower courts in applying the law, the People’s Supreme Court of China may issue interpretive 
                                                          
98 See supra notes 82 and 83.  
99 See Kanda and Milhaupt, supra note 97, at 897. 
100 See Robin Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where is it Now and Where is it Heading?, 
60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743 (2012); Colin Hawes, The Chinese "Oppression" Remedy: Creative Interpretations of 
Company Law by Chinese Courts, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 559 (2015); Guangdong Xu et al., Directors’ Duties in 
China,14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 57 (2013); Clarke and Howson, supra note 14. 
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rules and select model cases to guide lower courts on how to apply the vague CSR provision, 
similar to the way that the high court has done to other vague provisions of corporate law. 
Moreover, the Chinese experience indicates that additional legal infrastructure conducive to the 
judicial application of the CSR law exists outside the corporate law. As discussed, since the 
enactment of the CSR provision in the company law, the Chinese government has implemented 
various regulatory measures to promote CSR. The CSR provision under the corporate statute is a 
not a stand-alone law. It is part of a greater CSR scheme, which creates an environment to 
promote CSR awareness and increases the chances of judicial application.  
The empirical evidence in this article shows that Chinese courts often treat legal 
compliance as CSR. This compliance usage seems similar to Indonesian Constitutional Court’s 
view when ruling the constitutionality of the mandatory CSR provision under Indonesia’s 
Limited Liability Companies Act: “CSR has been implicitly regulated by other laws and 
regulations such as Forestry Law, Environmental Law, Water Resources Law and the Law on 
Gas and Oil” and administrative sanctions imposed under such laws serve an important way to 
punish companies failing to perform the CSR obligation under the company law.101 This 
compliance usage of CSR is also consistent with a commonly accepted view even in traditionally 
shareholder-oriented jurisdictions that profit maximization should still occur within the confines 
of law.102  
                                                          
101See Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No. 53/PUU-VI/2008. See also Laurensia Andrini, 
Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia, 28 MIMBAR HUKUM 512 (2016) (analyzing the 
constitutional case with a focus on whether there is sanction for the violation of the CSR provision under the 
company law).    
102 Milton Friedman, a leading advocate of profit maximization, maintained that “That responsibility is to 
conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible 
while conforming to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom.” See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N. Y. TIMES MAG., 
September 13, 1970. Also see e.g., Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L. J. 439, 411 (2001) (observing that profit maximization should be within the confines of law).  
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Meanwhile, China’s empirical experience shows its own features.  CSR as a broad and 
vague notion may have the capacity to accommodate any possible institutional demands. Similar 
CSR laws in different countries may carry different substantive meanings. As a result, any 
analysis of CSR laws should be mindful of different institutional settings. As noted, CSR in 
China incorporates the maintenance of social stability in support of the Chinese state’s interest. 
The meaning of CSR is shaped by China’s peculiar political realities. In addition, existing legal 
scholarship on the corporate purpose debate mainly refers to the experiences of English law 
countries such as Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Their court 
cases and relevant statutes are typically concerned about directors’ fiduciary duties.103 For 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly declared in two landmark cases that directors 
in discharging their fiduciary duties may consider the interests of shareholders, employees, 
consumers, creditors, suppliers, the government, the environment, etc.104 In the United States, the 
oft-cited corporate purpose cases including Ford, Revlon, EBay, etc. deal with whether the 
directors breached their fiduciary duties.105 The constituency statutes in the United States allow 
directors to consider non-shareholders’ interest in the context of hostile takeovers.106 The UK 
2006 Companies Act imposes directors a fiduciary duty to consider the interests of stakeholders 
for the benefit of shareholders.107 However, as this study shows, none of the Chinese court cases 
involves directors’ fiduciary duties. Instead, the CSR law in China has been applied in a variety 
                                                          
103 See e.g., Benedict Sheehy and Donald Feaver, Anglo-American Directors' Legal Duties and CSR: 
Prohibited, Permitted or Prescribed? 37 DALHOUSIE L. J. 345 (2012). 
104 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 2004 SCC 68; BCE Inc. v. 
1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560. 
105 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, C.A. No. 3705-CC (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 9, 2010). 
106 See Edward S. Adams and John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, 
49 EMORY L. J. 1085 (2000) (providing a good review and comparison of the statutes in different states). 
107 UK Companies Act (2006), art. 172.  
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of contexts unrelated to directors’ fiduciary duties. Akin to the experience of other areas of 
corporate law, Chinese courts have applied the CSR law in some innovative ways that go beyond 
the conventional scope perceived by legal scholars.108 The most insightful use is that Chinese 
courts take CSR as an important factor for equitable remedies such as judicial dissolution. This 
consequential use of CSR for the sake of “social stability” in judicial dissolution appears a 
Chinese characteristic in comparative corporate law perspective.109 China’s use of CSR in 
contexts other than directors’ fiduciary duties is probably because China’s CSR law is stated as a 
general principle for the existence of the corporation, much broader than directors’ fiduciary 
duties. On the one hand, the CSR law as a general corporate principle holds a great potential for 
unrestrained applications. On the other hand, the lack of an express connection between CSR and 
fiduciary duties in the statutory language demands higher capacity of the courts to perceive the 
linkage.  
  
 B. Policy-making Perspectives 
With increasing risks of climate change and social inequality across the world, it is 
possible that more and more countries will follow suit to enact a statutory provision that 
                                                          
108 See supra note 100; see also Jiangyu Wang, Enforcing Fiduciary Duties as Tort Liability in Chinese 
Courts, in ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW: CHINA AND THE WORLD (Robin 
Huang and Nicholas Howson eds., 2017).  
109 This author conducted a case law search in the LexisNexis (Quicklaw) database that covers five English 
law countries including US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the database, each jurisdiction has tens of 
thousands of court cases with the keyword of “judicial dissolution” or “winding-up by the court.” However, none of 
such dissolution cases includes any keywords of “corporate social responsibility,” “CSR,” “social stability” or 
“employee interest (protection).” Available practitioner’s guides and treatises of corporate law in US, UK and 
Canada also suggest a similar result. For the statute and case law on judicial resolution under Canada’s Business 
Corporations Act, see Wayne Gray, THE ANNOTATED CANADA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT (2015) 
I473-I494.4 (providing a detailed discussion of more than 100 important Canadian court cases in which courts 
granted or denied dissolutions); for US, see William Meade Flectcher and Carol A. Jones, FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS VOLUME 16A, 96-145 (2003) (providing 
detailed discussion on when courts in different states of US would grant or deny dissolution applications); for UK, 
see PALMER’S COMPANY LAW VOLUME 1, 8277-8286 & VOLUME 4, 15051-15092 (Geoffrey Morse ed., 
2018). 
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expressly recognizes CSR as part of the corporate purpose or to introduce many other forms of 
CSR law. Until now, there appears a regional diffusion of CSR law. China and India are 
geographically connected. India, Indonesia and Mauritius are all located around the Indian 
Ocean. Besides, in July 2018, Taiwan passed a revised corporate law that expressly authorizes 
the corporation to engage in CSR activities.110 The geographical proximity seems to play a role 
in the diffusion of the law. However, mimetic diffusion without institutional sensitivity is 
problematic. Policymakers who wish to make companies more socially responsible have multiple 
legal choices.  CSR may become part of law in various forms. Given a variety of legal options on 
the table, it is important to examine the function of each option, the relationship among the 
options, and their relationships with institutional environments.  
One mode of CSR legislation, as demonstrated in the Article 5 of China’s Company Law, 
is to include in the corporate statute a general CSR provision that requires the company to 
incorporate CSR into its daily business management. An important technical challenge of this 
approach is how to define CSR. The Chinese corporate statute does not provide any definition 
for CSR. Critics often say that undefined CSR leaves unclear what constitutes CSR and as a 
result inoperable in practice. 111 Given that scholars and international organizations have offered 
many CSR definitions ready to choose from, Chinese legislators could have simply adopted one 
with or without modifications. Nevertheless, why did they fail to do that? The definitional gap is 
                                                          
110 In early 2014, a legislator proposed a CSR law that required mandatory CSR reporting and mandatory 
CSR budget equivalent to 2% of the average net profit of the past 3 years or 0.1% of the prior-year revenues. The 
proposal was strongly opposed by associations of big companies. CSR advocates were also concerned about this 
externally imposed CSR action. In 2016, another legislator proposed a special CSR section for the corporate law, 
which defines different levels of CSR for firms of different sizes and nature. As of December 12, 2017, the 
Executive Yuan of Taiwan passed the proposed amendment to the corporate law and the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan 
finally passed the amendment on July 6, 2018. Now the Article 1 of the amended company law stands as: “In the 
course of doing business, the corporation shall comply with laws and ethical rules, may undertake actions promoting 
public interests to adequately discharge its social responsibility.” 
111 See supra note 11.   
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not necessarily a result of legislative failure.112 CSR is an evolving concept, historically 
equivalent to corporate philanthropy and now expanding to a comprehensive system of daily 
business management in global scope.113 Moreover, as the Chinese experience illustrates, the 
meaning of CSR varies with the political, economic and cultural factors at the national, sectoral, 
and organizational levels. A one-size-fits-all definition of CSR is unrealistic and inappropriate.114 
In this regard, the legal definition of CSR, if provided at all, will be very broad and abstract in 
order to accommodate different needs of business organizations. Alternatively, the law may 
specify CSR activities through bright-line rules. For instance, the law may enumerate specific 
CSR activities.115 However, this approach is probably problematic. CSR activities are context 
specific. Different business organizations have different CSR strategies. It is impossible for 
legislators or regulators to foresee all possible situations. If the law provides categories of 
specific CSR activities, it will always need to include a residual category to capture all other 
unspecified activities.116 The residual category will be broad and inevitably vague. In short, no 
matter how legislators define CSR, a great degree of definitional vagueness remains and it 
requires the capable judiciary to fill in the content on a case-by-case basis. Policymakers shall 
                                                          
112 See Michael Kerr et al., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (2009) 
(holding a similar view that “This definitional gap could be explained by the fact that CSR is in a constant state of 
evolution and, arguably, should never be subject to a fixed, universal definition”).   
113 See Archie B. Carroll, A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 19-46 (Andrew Crane et al., eds., 2008). 
114 See Antonio Argandona, Corporate Social Responsibility: One Size Does Not Fit All. Collecting 
Evidence from Europe, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 221 (2009); Marcel van Marrewijk, Concepts and Definitions of CSR 
and Corporate Sustainability: Between Agency and Communication, 44 J. BUS. ETHICS 95 (2003) (arguing that “a 
‘one solution fits all’ definition of CSR should be abandoned, accepting various and more specific definitions 
matching the development, awareness and ambitions levels of organizations”).   
115 India’s CSR regulations adopt this approach. Although India’s corporate statute does not define CSR, 
the implementation regulations provide a list of permitted and non-permitted CSR activities. See The Ministry Of 
Corporate Affairs of India, The Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014, R. 5(1) (Feb. 27, 
2014). 
116 India’s CSR regulations provide a negative example. The rules do not include a residual category. To 
the contrary, India’s CSR regulations exclude “activities undertaken in the normal business course of the company.” 
See Afra Afsharipour and Shruti Rana, The Emergence of New Corporate Social Responsibility Regimes in China 
and India, 14 UC DAVIS BUS. L. 175, 223-224 (2014) (criticizing the regulations unreasonably narrowing the 
scope of CSR and falling short of an expansive stakeholder view of CSR).  
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not be fixated on the definitional construction of CSR but shall be attentive to the capacity 
building of the judiciary.   
Moreover, China’s corporate law does not provide non-shareholders with any rights to 
enforce the CSR provision against the corporation or directors.  It significantly limits the 
compulsory nature of the law. Without any enforcement rights given to non-shareholders, the 
function of the CSR provision under the corporate statute will be largely extra-judicially, non-
adjudicative and expressive. The dominance of compliance and exhortatory cases in China 
suggests that as a standard of conduct, the CSR provision expressly legitimates activities that do 
not maximize shareholder wealth but it does not impose any additional legal obligation on the 
corporation. Meanwhile, as a judicial review standard revealed in the consequential cases, the 
CSR law gives an additional legal ground based on which the court may justify its decision in 
favor of the interests of society. From a legal perspective, the importance of the CSR provision 
under the Chinese corporate statute is more for a court ruling standard than a corporate behavior 
standard.117 This approach of turning CSR into law places high demands on judicial capacity.  
Compared with a general CSR duty stated in the corporate statute, a stronger form of 
CSR in the corporate law context is to give non-shareholders such as employees the right to 
participate in the central decision-making institution of the corporation, i.e., the board of 
directors. Many countries including China have long allowed or required employee 
representation in the boardroom. A recent cross-national empirical study suggests that firms with 
a two-tier board structure that includes employee representation have better CSR performance.118 
                                                          
117 A standard of conduct specifies how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role while a 
standard of review is the rule with which the court determines whether to impose liability or grant relief. See Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993) (discussing the importance to recognize the differences between standards of 
conduct and standards of review as they sometimes may differ especially in corporate law). 
118 See Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog, On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility, 72 J. FIN. 
853 (2017). 
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However, the adoption of dual boards has been significantly declining over the years.119 In 
China, empirical evidence shows that employee representation on the supervisory board remains 
decorative.120 The absence of evidence of active enforcement of the general CSR duty raises a 
concern that the vague general CSR duty may be a rather weak substitute for or complement to 
preexisting employee participation rights that are unpopular or unenforced.  
Another approach to CSR legislation related with corporate governance is to adopt a 
special business form called the social enterprise, a new and increasingly popular type of 
business organization that combines profit seeking with public benefit purposes. The United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom and many other European countries have introduced a kind 
of social enterprise legislation.121 Such social enterprise laws usually provide an array of specific 
mechanisms such as benefit enforcement proceedings, third-party certification, assets locks, 
dividend caps and exit restrictions to ensure the company’s commitment to the dual goals. China 
has not yet adopted a comparable form of social enterprise law.122 Many Chinese scholars are 
                                                          
119 The two-tier board that includes employee representatives is mandatory in Germany and Austria while it 
is optional in countries such as France and Finland. The vast majority (77 %) of listed companies included in the 
France’s SBF120 index use a unitary board while only 18% have opted for a two-tier board.  See The French 
Institute of Directors, French Corporate Governance In Listed Companies: Driving Growth and Attractiveness 
(September 2012), http://campus.hec.fr/club_finance/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ven.pdf. 
120 See e.g., Weian Li and Chen Hao, Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Jianshihui Zhili Pingjia Shizheng Yanjiu 
[An Empirical Study of Supervisory Board Governance in China’s Listed Companies], 2006 J. SHANGHAI U. FIN. 
ECON.78 (2006); Limin Wang and Shiquan Wang, Zhongguo Minying Shangshi Gongsi Jianshihui Zhili Pingjia Ji 
Shizheng Fenxi [An Evaluation and Empirical Analysis of Supervisory Board Governance of China’s Listed Private 
Companies], 11 INQUIRY INTO ECON. ISSUES 120 (2007). 
121 For US, see J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 543-555 
(2016) (providing an overview of the social enterprise laws in the United States); J. Haskell Murray, Social 
Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Pubic Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345 (2014) (evaluating 
mechanisms to hold directors responsible under the Delaware law). For UK, see David Cabrelli, A Distinct “Social 
Enterprise” Law in the UK: The Case of the CIC, (2016) Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2016/27, 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888486. For Canada, see Gail Elizabeth 
Henderson, Could Community Contribution Companies Improve Access to Justice?, 94 CAN. B. REV. 209 (2016); 
Carol Liao, A Critical Canadian Perspective on the Benefit Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 683 (2017). For 
Europe, see European Council, A Map of Social Enterprises and Their Eco-System in Europe: Synthesis Report 
(2015), available at https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=12988&langId=en. 
122 The “social welfare enterprise” (shehui fuli qiye) in China is arguably a form of social enterprise. 
However, it is not a modern business corporation and has its historical roots in the 1950s. The purpose of the social 
welfare enterprise is legally defined, i.e. to provide disabled people with employment. The social welfare enterprise 
is not a corporation and it does not have governance features anywhere comparable to the so-called “benefit 
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enthusiastic about transplanting a social enterprise law.123 Given that China’s Company Law 
explicitly states that CSR is a general duty for all corporations, a social enterprise law appears 
redundant. Nevertheless, China’s Company Law is unclear about how to enforce the general 
CSR duty (i.e., Article 5). As one Chinese court opined that the beneficiaries of Article 5 are 
unspecific, 124 it is bewildering about who has the legal standing to sue when the CSR mandate is 
breached. More importantly, most Chinese courts simply treat CSR under Article 5 no more than 
a duty of legal compliance or use it as a legal space to encourage socially responsible behavior. 
They generally refrain from imposing any additional legal burden on corporations based on 
Article 5. In this regard, the adoption of a social enterprise law in China may provide an option 
for Chinese firms that wish to hold themselves to a higher CSR standard and signal serious 
commitment to CSR. 
The various forms of CSR law are not mutually exclusive but often complementary. For 
instance, an imposition of the general CSR duty under the corporate statute does not preclude the 
conservative approach of mandatory CSR by directly raising legal standards for labor and 
environmental performance. Policymakers should be clear about what can be achieved through 
the law. For example, given that corporate law already requires corporations to engage in CSR, is 
it necessary to introduce social enterprises? Also, given employees already have the right to 
board representation but such right is often neglected and ill enforced, how does a general CSR 
duty add any help? Finally, no matter which legal policy is chosen, enforcement is the key. Like 
other legislations, mandatory CSR laws will be a result of compromise among different interest 
                                                          
corporation” in the US, the community contribution company in Canada, or the community interest company in the 
UK.   
123 See e.g., Rebecca Lee, The Emergence of Social Enterprises in China: The Quest for Space and 
Legitimacy, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 79 (2009); Yunhui Fan, Lun Woguo Shehui Qiye Falu Xingtai de 
Gaige [On The Reform of China’s Social Enterprise Law] 34 L. REV. 105 (2016).   
124 Supra note 74. 
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groups.125 Concessions may be made in the use of statutory language, the scope of companies 
covered by the law, the implementation rules and enforcement institutions, etc. This article takes 
China as an example to illustrate whether and how the highly vague CSR law has been applied in 
court cases. The practical application of the law depends on the capacity of related legal 
infrastructure as well as socio-political institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
 The recent emergence of (ostensibly) mandatory CSR law mainly in developing countries 
raises controversies. Critics of CSR denounce the law as a serious violation of the sacred 
corporate principle of profit maximization. Even advocates of CSR embrace the law with great 
caution. As the statutory language of CSR is vague and open-ended, courts play a particularly 
important role in interpreting the meaning of CSR. Considered that countries that have adopted 
the CSR law are primarily those without mature legal institutions, it is commonly believed that 
the CSR law has no practical use in the courtroom. The empirical experience in China indicates 
some promises and lessons of the vague CSR law. Among various findings, this article shows 
that the CSR law is not entirely useless in the courtroom and the legal meaning of CSR is 
context-specific and sensitive to institutional settings. The expressive function of the CSR law is 
relatively easy to come by; however, the adjudicative function of the law intensively depends on 
                                                          
125 India and Indonesia offer vivid examples of the politics of CSR legislation. See Caroline Van Zile, 
India’s Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility Proposal: Creative Capitalism Meets Creative Regulation in the 
Global Market, 13 ASIAN PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 270, 295-297 (2012) (explaining the Indian government made 
many concessions in the face of immense pressure from big corporations); Andrew Rosser and Donni Edwin, The 
Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia, 23 PAC. REV. 1 (2010) (providing a detailed account of 
Indonesia’s CSR lawmaking process: political parties and the bureaucracy supported mandatory CSR because they 
intended to redistribute wealth from large foreign and ethnic Chinese companies to themselves and indigenous 
Indonesian businesses that make up their patronage; while dominant foreign and ethnic Chinese companies failed to 
stop the passage of the mandatory CSR law, they were successful in delaying the promulgation of implementation 
rules).      
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the capacity of related legal infrastructure and the macro socio-political conditions. Given that a 
vague and open-ended CSR definition is inevitable, the critical legal question is concerned about 
the legal infrastructure capacity to deliver the concrete CSR meaning sensitive to the context of 
each case rather than the obsession with drafting a perfect and encompassing definition of CSR 
in the legislation. 
